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Article 8

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING THE RULES OF “TRUTH”

JANE H. AIKEN*
Purpose and Construction: These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion
of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.1

Sometimes I chuckle, other times I panic, when I reflect on the fact that as
an Evidence teacher, I am ostensibly in the business of teaching the rules to get
to truth. Imagine that. “I know the rules and I am going to teach them to you
so that you can use those rules and get to truth yourself!” I wonder sometimes
how I manage to hold my head up on that first day of Evidence class and
discuss the purposes of the rules of evidence. Could there be a more
impertinent statement than, “The rules of evidence are designed to ensure the
admission of undistorted evidence that will help the trier of fact evaluate the
evidence and arrive at the truth?” I say that without once engaging in the
philosophical discussion of what do we mean when we say “truth,” although I
imagine that might improve my teaching. But of course, if I did that, I might
never get to all the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Nevertheless, the modern Evidence course offers a unique opportunity to
involve students in activities in which virtually no other course regularly taken
in law school asks them to engage.2 Instead of studying appellate cases in
which the facts have already been found, students in Evidence think about how
lawyers present those facts so that they can be “found.”3 It is both a
deconstructing and a constructing endeavor with the ultimate goal being that
the fact-finder finds the truth. While we are training students how to reduce

* William M. Van Cleve Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Katherine Goldwasser for her insights into teaching and grasp of the
scope and importance of these issues, and for her excellent, comprehensive, and generous editing
and also Mark Cooke, my research assistant, for his tireless efforts to find support for sometimes
unsupportable propositions.
1. FED. R. EVID. 102.
2. I am not the first to write about how procedure courses are ripe teaching tools for social
justice lessons. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1223 (1993).
3. Evidence courses used to be taught via the study of appellate cases, but the teaching
methodology has shifted to a more problem-based approach in recent years.
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complex legal problems into meaningful bits of evidence that give a picture of
what happened, we also can teach them to appreciate how often truth depends
on point of view.4 The context in which rules are applied deeply affects their
meaning. Such an insight transcends the Evidence course and can help open
students’ eyes to the fact that even facially neutral procedural rules implicate
social justice concerns.5
Students are often aware of substantive problems with the justice system,
particularly the criminal justice system. The recent spate of post-conviction
exonerations has heightened this awareness.6 Innocence projects across the
country have drawn attention to the perils of eyewitness testimony and all-toofrequent incidences of coerced confessions, shoddy police practices, and
prosecutorial misconduct. The prevalence of racial disparity at every stage of
the criminal justice process has also been widely noted.7 The attention given
to exonerations and the deep racial bias embedded in our criminal justice
system provides an opportunity to raise questions about how the rules of
evidence might not lead to truth when the defendant does not share the same
world view as the largely majoritarian police, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, and jurors who make the system work.8
One of the most important functions for the rules of evidence is to create a
rubric in which accurate judgments can be made about the facts of cases. The
law of evidence poses as a “neutral” body of procedural law, based in rational
decision-making and immune from questions of values. The goal of a trial is
to facilitate the presentation of a sufficient amount of evidence about a past
event so that any fact-finder can bring to bear his or her “general knowledge”
of how the world works to determine what happened and what the outcome
should be. The idea is that the fact-finder applies common sense to rationally

4. It can also be a course in which point of view is disguised. See Ann Althouse, The Lying
Woman, The Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 914 (1994).
5. Teaching social justice lessons can be a bit dicey. One runs the risk of being “preachy”
or becoming a talk show host instead of a law school professor. For an interesting article about
this danger, see Frank Rene Lopez, Pedagogy on Teaching Race & Law: Beyond “Talk Show”
Discussions, 10 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2004).
6. Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do With It?: A Commentary on Wrongful
Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 1316.
7. See generally Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Special Theme: The Other
Race-Effect and Contemporary Criminal Justice: Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision
Making: Jury Decision Making: White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201 (2001).
8. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the
Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 (2004); Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclusive?: What Grutter v.
Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101 (2004).
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produced evidence.9
The problem with this fundamental assumption
underlying all of evidence law is that when the trial involves a litigant whose
experience differs from the “general knowledge” of the world, the rules of
evidence not only have a difficult time coping with the litigant’s alternate
world views, but often actively silence them.10 General knowledge, therefore,
might better be read as “dominant (and sometimes inaccurate) view.”11
This Essay offers a few examples of ways in which Evidence professors
can engage students in critical analysis of how deeply a point of view can
influence the way the Rules apply. My hope is that through this understanding
the students will no longer think of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a neutral
body of procedural rules that if faithfully applied will result in “truth.” I
believe this insight is one of the most critical that a law student can gain in law
school. It will make students more thoughtful in their analysis and application
of the Rules, but more importantly, it will make them better critical thinkers
and, ultimately, better lawyers.
Point of view is critical to the operation of the relevance rules. The
Federal Rules define relevance as “any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the [litigation] more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”12 The students confront what appears
to be a neutral and impartial rule that merely calls for the application of logic
to determine admissibility. Nevertheless, relevance rules are particularly
susceptible to “invisible” bias. What is relevant depends on one’s perspective.
For those outside the mainstream of judges (which is a great many people),
the perspective and experience brought to bear in determining relevance have
significant implications. A suspect’s “nervousness” when approached by a
police officer might be offered to show consciousness of guilt. Generally, a
judge would not be nervous if a police officer approached him or her. Only if
one had something to hide, a judge might think, would the approach of a police
officer cause alarm. An excellent example of this phenomenon is Justice
Scalia’s biblical foray in California v. Hodari.13 In Hodari, some young
people saw the police and ran, and the police gave chase and eventually
arrested one of them on drug charges.14 Scalia wrote for the majority and at
one point in the opinion, after noting that the state had conceded the police did

9. See generally Symposium, Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST.
REV. 847.
10. See Marilyn MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules
Evidence, 25 U.B.C. L. REV. 36, 39 (1991).
11. This has been empirically demonstrated in the race context. See, e.g., Sommers
Ellsworth, supra note 7; Chet K. W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil
Ignorance, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373 (2005).
12. FED. R. EVID. 401.
13. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
14. Id. at 622–23.
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not have reasonable suspicion (which clearly angered him), gratuitously opined
“[t]hat it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who
scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and
arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 28:1 (‘The
wicked flee when no man pursueth’).”15
Therefore, the evidence of the suspect’s nervousness makes it somewhat
more likely than it would be without the evidence that the suspect is guilty.
Taken from another perspective, that of a person continually harassed by
police officers, the “nervous behavior” does not indicate consciousness of guilt
but rather fear of police abuse.16 If this were the reason for the suspect’s
nervousness, the evidence would be irrelevant. However, given the minimal
threshold of Rule 401, the fact that the nervousness might be explained by
consciousness of guilt is sufficient to establish relevance. The question then
becomes, how much weight does one give to the evidence when rules requiring
an evaluation of weight, like Rule 403, are brought to bear? This is when point
of view has its greatest effect. It is likely that the judge’s evaluation of weight
will be considerably different from that of the person continually harassed by
police.
Rule 403, the unfair prejudice rule,17 can be used to exclude evidence out
of concern that juries will overvalue it, but the Rule is certainly under-utilized
in this way. Normally evidence professors focus on the gruesome photograph
or evidence of the witness’s engagement in morally questionable behavior as
classic examples of material giving rise to a Rule 403 objection. Such reliance
misses an opportunity both to teach a more nuanced understanding of Rule 403
and to engage the students in a firsthand experience of how weight depends on

15. Id. at 623 n.1. Of course, occasionally judges understand the outsider perspective. In his
dissent in Hodari, Justice Stevens responded to Justice Scalia on this point:
The Court’s gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1, see ante, at 623, n. 1, mistakenly
assumes that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden approach of strangers.
We have previously considered, and rejected, this ivory-towered analysis of the real world
for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, particularly if they are members
of a minority. See generally Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93
Yale L. J. 214 (1983). It has long been “a matter of common knowledge that men who
are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being
apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is
it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth,
but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’” Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511
(1896).
499 U.S. at 630 n.4.
16. See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999).
17. Unfair prejudice is but one of several grounds for excluding evidence under Rule 403.
For purposes of this analysis, I am focusing on the unfair prejudice dimension of the rule. See
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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point of view. Several Evidence scholars have used the case of People v.
Adamson18 to do just that. Taking their lead,19 I first give the students these
facts:
Josey Smith has been murdered. When the police arrived at the scene, they
found her body sprawled on the floor. She had been stabbed with a knife. Her
stockings had been rolled down her legs and the tops of the stockings were cut
off. (I remind them that the case took place many years ago, and she wore
stockings, not pantyhose.). For reasons that do not matter here, the police get a
warrant to search Paul Wilson’s house. Mr. Wilson is an African American
male who works as a dock worker at the docks near his home. While
searching his apartment, they find a drawer full of the tops of ladies’ stockings.
None of these stocking tops matched Josey Smith’s stockings. Paul Wilson is
indicted for the murder.

My first question to the students is, “Is the evidence that Mr. Wilson had a
drawer full of stocking tops relevant to the prosecution’s case?” Invariably,
my students have said “yes.” I then ask them to tell me what inferential links
they would make to find such evidence relevant. I get an answer something
like this: “A woman who has been murdered had the tops of her stockings cut
off. It is unlikely that the woman wore her stockings that way on purpose. It
seems far more likely that the cutting of the stocking tops was related to the
murder. That being the case, the person who murdered the woman must have
had had some kind of interest in the tops of women’s stockings. A man who
keeps tops of women’s stockings in a drawer has some kind of interest in such
stocking tops. Paul Wilson must have some kind of interest in the tops of
women’s stockings. The evidence showing that he has such an interest makes
it somewhat more likely, than it would be without the evidence, that he is the
man who killed her.”
After going through the relevance analysis, I then ask, “What about a
possible 403 objection? Is there any potential for unfair prejudice?” A student
usually suggests that the prejudice might be that the jury might think Mr.
Wilson is kinky and might punish him for that (or at least be less concerned
about wrongly convicting him for the murder) and not use the evidence for its
relevant purpose. Other students have suggested that the jury may not have
clear knowledge that the defendant’s stocking tops do not match the victim’s
stockings, and as such they could overvalue the evidence as a result. On the
whole, however, the bulk of the students believe that such prejudice does not
substantially outweigh the probative value.
18. 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946).
19. This problem was developed by Katherine Goldwasser and is discussed in her article,
Response to Edward J. Imwinkelried, the Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on
the Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (2000). She credits
Laird C. Kirkpatrick and Christopher B. Mueller, the authors of a well-known Evidence text, with
the idea. See id. at 232 n.23.
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I then ask, “What if the evidence was that Ms. Smith was found murdered
and her T.V. was missing. Mr. Wilson’s house was searched and they found a
T.V. but it wasn’t the same T.V. that was missing from the victim’s house.
Would that evidence be relevant in his prosecution for murder?” The students
readily answer that this would not be relevant because there is not enough
connection.
I then follow with “How are stocking tops different from a T.V.?”
Students point out that stocking tops are peculiar . . . it is too much a
coincidence that she had stocking tops missing and he had stocking tops in his
drawer. I then probe what they mean by “peculiar.” “How do you know that it
is peculiar? How important is the idea that it is peculiar to your assessment of
probative value and unfair prejudice?” The students agree that the peculiarity
is the critical aspect of this evidence giving it both relevance and weight.
Finally, I ask, “What if I told you that at the time of these events, Mr.
Wilson processed his hair and that it was very common at the time for African
American men to put stocking tops on their hair to protect it when they
worked. Furthermore, as a dockworker, he and many of his coworkers, both
white and black, routinely wore stocking tops over their hair to protect it from
the material that comes down on them when they are unloading ships. Does
that change your mind as to its probative value and unfair prejudice?” I then
engage the students in a discussion about how the probative value is decreased
because it is not peculiar for Mr. Wilson to have tops of stockings in his
drawer given his cultural and employment background. The unfair prejudice is
great because the jury may draw the same conclusions that the students did at
the beginning of the analysis.
I have found that leading the students through this analysis leads to insight
because they experience firsthand the confusion and prejudice that Rule 403 is
designed to prevent. More importantly, they get a life lesson as lawyers about
thinking through a case and not jumping to conclusions about relevance and
probative value without understanding the context in which it arises. Point of
view makes all the difference. Indeed, I often find my questioning shortcircuited as an African-American student understands immediately the
prejudice of admission of this evidence and educates the rest of us about the
use of stocking tops. I leave the students with the question, “What if you had
been representing the defendant in this case and had failed to object to this
evidence or had failed to educate the judge or jury about the lack of peculiarity
of this item of evidence? Would the evidence presented at trial, having cleared
the rules of evidence, help lead to the truth?”
Character evidence rules are rich with possibilities for exploring the impact
of point of view. Character rules are based on the optimistic idea, expressed in
Rule 404(a), that people are not defined by their past acts: once a thief, not
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always a thief.20 Known as the “propensity rule,” this optimistic idea allows
the Evidence professor to discuss the ways in which the rules of evidence can
be used to level the playing field, to avoid the everyday shortcuts in judgment
that we rely upon in daily life and focus the fact-finder on the events that gave
rise to the litigation. Not using the past as indicative of present behavior (she
did X in the past, so she must be the sort of person who does X, so she
probably did X on the occasion at issue in the lawsuit) is very different from
how people often make decisions. The justice system’s insistence on dealing
with the present, not the past, is worth discussing with students. At the same
time, the insistence that the past is not admissible to prove action in conformity
also demonstrates how evidence rules encourage juries to evaluate individual
acts without regard to context. For those individuals who have suffered under
racial, gender, or class bias, however, the context of their acts can explain a
great deal. I try to teach this with the following problem:
Wilma Washington is being tried for the murder of her husband. She has
asserted self-defense and is prepared at trial to testify about the years of abuse
that she suffered from her husband. The prosecution plans to impeach her
testimony at trial with her confession on the night of the murder. She had
called 911 and said, “I have killed my husband.” When the police arrived at
the house, she was sobbing over his body and took full responsibility for her
husband’s death. When asked who caused her bruises, she had told the officer
that she had fallen down the steps. When the officer on the scene asked if her
husband had abused her, she had significantly downplayed any history of
abuse. At trial, however, Wilma testifies that her husband beat her daily over
eleven years of marriage and that recently the beatings had become more
frequent and more brutal. The prosecution offers her confession both to
impeach her current testimony about the events and as substantive evidence of
her guilt.
The defense attorney seeks to offer into evidence the testimony of a physician
who had examined Ms. Washington, three years prior to the killing. The
physician had treated her in the emergency room for a broken nose, dislocated
jaw, and small round burns on her chest. The doctor will testify that the doctor
suspected domestic abuse and asked Ms. Washington about whether Mr.
Washington had inflicted the wounds. The doctor is prepared to testify that

20. The Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 404(a) refer to the California Law Revision
Commission’s rejection of a rule permitting the admission of character evidence to indicate action
in conformity. As quoted in the Advisory Committee Notes, the Commission said:
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the
particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and punish
the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case
shows actually happened.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) Advisory Committee’s Notes.
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when asked that question, Ms. Washington immediately began defending her
husband and downplayed the violence.

I then ask the students: “What is the relevance of the doctor’s testimony?”
The students first see it as evidence of past abuse but then at some point, a
student will say, “It shows that when confronted with questions about her
abuser’s behavior, she covers for him and downplays the violence. This is
relevant to show how much (or how little) weight the jury should give the
confession.” I next ask, “Is it admissible for that purpose?” “What kind of
evidence will the prosecution say this is?” (Propensity evidence) “What are
the hurdles she must clear?” (Getting them looking at Rule 404).
The student will often look to the “mercy rule,” Rule 404(a)(1), as a way to
introduce the doctor’s description of Ms. Washington’s behavior as evidence
of a “pertinent trait” of her character.21 I ask, “If offered as 404(a)(1)
evidence, what form must that evidence take?” If the student does not spot the
problem, I point them to the Rule’s restriction requiring that proof of a
“pertinent trait” of character be in the form of opinion or reputation evidence
but not by evidence of specific acts.22 That will severely limit the doctor’s
testimony if the court determines that this is a “pertinent” trait. In order to get
the specifics in, the student might turn to Rule 404(b) and argue that the
evidence is offered for another purpose akin to a common scheme or plan.
However, this evidence appears to lack the specificity and identity that would
permit it to get out from under the fatal “propensity” label and constitute a
“common scheme or plan.”23
Thus the character bar may well limit Ms. Washington’s ability to show
how she was socialized to defer to men, how she has downplayed violence in
the past, and how she might readily confess to acts she did not do or fail to
focus on possible defenses because of her history with the batterer.24 Without
this evidence, the finder of facts has only his or her own experience to draw
upon. What looks like irrational behavior to the “average” viewer (it makes no
sense to think that a victim of violence at the hands of her husband would ever
seek to downplay what he was doing to her), might, in fact, be quite rational in
light of the context. The general, “rational,” view may not capture the
experience of the battered woman and may therefore lead to wrong
conclusions. Once again, application of the rules by a neutral mind is not the
path to truth.

21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 405.
23. See Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 786–87 (1980).
24. See Kersti A. Yllo & Murray A. Straus, Patriarchy and Violence Against Wives: The
Impact of Structural and Normative Factors, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES:
RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES, at 383, 392–94 (1990).
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Conceivably, the defense could try to address this problem by calling an
expert witness who could provide important background or context for the jury
to use in assessing the believability of Ms. Washington’s version of events.
Before such an expert would be permitted to testify, however, the proponent
would have to contend with a significant obstacle. In effect, the proffered
testimony would go to Ms. Washington’s credibility. But under the rules of
evidence, experts generally are not allowed to make credibility assessments
because witness credibility is thought to be well within the jury’s ken.25 This
general restriction on expert testimony is another opportunity to explore “the
rules of truth.” Jurors are perfectly able to assess credibility without the help
of an expert because fact-finders share the ability to use their “common sense”
to evaluate witness demeanor, hesitancy, eye contact, and inconsistency.
These “credibility attributes” are assumed to be the same for all witnesses, no
matter what their age, gender, class, race, or ethnicity is, or the context in
which such statements are made. In short, jurors are ostensibly experts in
“human behavior” and as such, to make credibility determinations, they need
only draw upon their universally applicable ideas about what indicates lack of
truthfulness. These supposed “givens” fly in the face of the social scientific
literature on the subject, which makes clear that notions of what constitutes
“typical” evasive behavior, such as an unwillingness to look someone in the
eye, are actually culturally specific. Thus, for example, an unwillingness to
look someone in the eye is viewed as a strong sign of dishonesty in American
culture.26 That behavior in other cultures would not indicate a lack of
truthfulness at all, but rather deferential behavior appropriate in a courtroom.27
In such a case, the rules of evidence may thwart, instead of foster, truth.
The same assumption that fact-finders bring a shared universal
understanding of facts can be seen in evidence law’s treatment of admissions
by silence. The Federal Rules permit fact finders to infer statements from the
silence of a party when, as the Advisory Committee points out, “the person
would, under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if
untrue.”28 The Notes go on to say that “[t]he decision in each case calls for an
evaluation in terms of probable human behavior.”29 The meaning of a
person’s silence, like eye contact, can depend on culture as well as experience.
Truth here is a matter of point of view. The party may be merely reticent about
contradicting another, may be suspicious and therefore silent, or may be
inattentive due to incapacity caused by drug withdrawal or another condition
25. Although, “beyond the jury’s ken” is not a standard articulated in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, judges often use it in their determination of whether an expert is needed.
26. William Y. Chin, Multiple Cultures, One Criminal Justice System: The Need for a
“Culutural Ombudsman” in the Courtroom, 53 Drake L. Rev. 651, 659 (2005).
27. Id.
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) Advisory Committee’s Note.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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that one would not want aired in front of a fact-finder. Yet the Rule assumes
universal cultural competence, leaving little room for such differences.
Admissions by silence may also silence truth.
Not all rules of evidence are substantively neutral. The recently adopted
exceptions to the character rules with regard to child abuse and sexual
assault,30 provide an avenue for discussion of why we would select these
particular past acts to be singled out for different treatment rather than others.31
To highlight these issues, I offer the following problem:
Michael Tsosie is charged under two separate federal statutes with child sexual
assault and fraud. The indictment alleges that Mr. Tsosie was employed at a
child care center that offered care for the children of federal employees, a
position he allegedly obtained by making fraudulent misrepresentations on his
application for the position. The child sexual assault charges were brought
after a parent of a 4-year-old child in the day care center alleged that Mr.
Tsosie fondled the child on three occasions while the child was in his care. As
part of its case in chief, the prosecution intends to offer a witness who will
testify that the defendant fondled her thirty years prior when she was six years
old and he was her caregiver. When she told her parents of his acts, they
immediately fired Mr. Tsosie. Her parents did not report the incidents to the
police at the time because the witness was reluctant to talk about the
molestation and they did not want to put her through a trial. The parents are
now deceased. The witness says she still has a clear memory of what Mr.
Tsosie did to her, and when she heard that he had been given a position of trust
caring for young children and was charged with child molestation, she felt it
was her duty to come forward.
The fraud charge in the indictment was added when this witness emerged,
because the employment application for the child care center asked if Mr.
Tsosie had ever been fired from a job caring for children and he did not
disclose the thirty-year-old firing. In support of the fraud charge, the
prosecution intends to call a witness who was a former employer of Mr.
Tosie’s. This witness will testify that Mr. Tsosie had filled out an application
to work at the witness’s place of business just last year, that the application had
asked about firings within the past five years, and that Mr. Tsosie failed to
disclose on the application that he had been fired from another position the
year before for drinking on the job.

I then ask the students, will either of these two prosecution witnesses be
permitted to testify? What objections are likely to be raised by the defense?

30. FED. R. EVID. 413–15.
31. See generally David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994); Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other
Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713 (1981); Jane Harris
Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the Propensity Rule, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 1221 (1997).
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What arguments will the prosecution make to try to meet those objections?
How should the court rule?
This permits a discussion of the fact that the propensity to lie on
employment applications, although fresh and relevant to the charge, would not
be allowed under Rule 404’s character bar. However, the prior acts of child
sexual abuse would not be barred by Rule 404 since they are permitted under
Rule 414. There may be an argument to preclude the evidence under Rule 403
but that would focus on problems with this evidence other than character.
Why treat the character testimony differently? Unlike the subtle analysis that
is required to identify how supposedly “neutral” rules have a negative impact
on “outsiders,” Rules 413 and 414 offer a real opportunity to discuss how
procedural rules can be used substantively to disfavor a despised group. These
Rules facilitate law enforcement’s tendency to “round up the usual suspects”
and then compound the chance of wrongful conviction by having the very
evidence that may have placed the defendant under suspicion to begin with be
used to prove the charged conduct. This significantly undermines the
presumption of innocence that is part of what prompts the general character bar
reflected in Rule 404. The result may be a wrongful conviction at odds with
the truth of these events.
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that sometimes cultural context
does matter. There are rules designed to minimize the effect of cultural
preconceptions that are thought to cause people to give undue probative value
to certain types of evidence.32 These are “truth-seeking” rules. They operate
on the theory that excluding evidence is sometimes necessary in order to try to
ensure that deeply rooted but unfounded preconceptions are not indulged. One
of the primary rules of evidence that is designed to remedy the problem of
giving undue probative value to a type of evidence is Rule 412,33 the so–called
“Rape Shield Rule,” which limits the admissibility of evidence of a sex offense
victim’s sexual past in both criminal and civil cases.34
Rule 412 offers very specific guidance in its criminal application for when
evidence of a victim’s prior sexual behavior or predisposition can be offered.
However, unlike the criminal section of the Rule, the civil section of Rule 412
leaves the determination of admissibility to the discretion of the judge.35 The
judge weighs whether the evidence’s “probative value substantially outweighs
the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”36
Again, I use a problem. This one is based on an Eleventh Circuit opinion.
32. See generally Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping with
Preconceptions Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559 (2002).
33. FED. R. EVID. 412.
34. Aiken, supra note 32, at 559. In 1994, Congress made significant changes to the Rules,
including clarifying the criminal Rule and extending it to civil actions. Id.
35. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
36. Id.
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The plaintiff, Ms. Judd, brings a tort action against the defendant for wrongful
transmission of a sexually transmitted disease. She asserts a damage claim for
both physical and emotional injury. She alleges that she contracted herpes
from the defendant and she feels depressed and dirty due to the infection. At
trial, the defendant offers testimony about the plaintiff on several subjects,
including: the fact that she had breast augmentation surgery before she met the
defendant, her past sexual activity, and her employment as a nude dancer.37

I ask the students to analyze each piece of evidence to determine its
relevance and its admissibility under Rule 412.38 The students readily identify
that the evidence of the plaintiff’s prior sexual activity is directly relevant to
causation of a sexually transmitted disease. Therefore, this evidence has high
probative value with little unfair prejudice or harm to the victim, provided that
whether the defendant was the source of the plaintiff’s disease is at issue. The
students have much more difficulty with the breast augmentation and
employment as a nude dancer. Most suggest that these have little probative
value to her claim in the lawsuit and thus should be excluded under Rule 412’s
balancing test. I then tell the students that the problem is based on a real case,
explain that the trial court in the case admitted both items of evidence, and
share with them some of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of these rulings on
appeal.
I find three aspects of the opinion particularly useful for class discussion.
First, there is a brief background discussion of appellate review of district court
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, in which the court says that although
such review is ordinarily highly deferential, review of rulings under Rule 412
is “more [stringent] in view of the presumption of inadmissibility of evidence
of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior or . . . predisposition.”39 Second, there
is a review of the trial court’s “weighing” under Rule 412 of the probative
value of the nude dancing evidence against its possible unfair prejudice or
harm to the plaintiff, in which the appellate court approves the following
reasoning: the fact that plaintiff worked as a nude dancer both before and after
she contracted the sexually transmitted disease gave the evidence real
probative value vis-à-vis plaintiff’s claim that she was distressed and felt
“dirty” after she contracted the disease; and the fact that a good deal of other
evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual history and predisposition was properly
admitted at trial meant there was little or no prejudice.40 Third, there is the
court’s treatment of the plaintiff’s claim as to the breast augmentation surgery
evidence. Although the court did not actually reach the merits of this issue, its
handling of the issue was telling. Here, the ruling was that the plaintiff had

37.
38.
39.
40.

Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 1997).
Whether Rule 412 applied was raised on appeal but was not decided. Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1341 n.6.
Id. at 1343.
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waived any objection based on Rule 412, because her objection at trial had
been on relevancy grounds.41
I begin with the waiver of objection ruling. At first, this strikes the
students as perhaps unfortunate for the plaintiff, but hardly noteworthy as a
matter of evidence law; they learn early-on all about the pitfalls of failing to
preserve evidence issues for appeal.42 But then I begin exploring with them a
number of questions about the ruling, such as, “What bearing do you think it
might have had on how the plaintiff framed her objections below that the case
was in effect being tried as though Rule 412 did not even apply?”43 Also,
what, if anything, are we to make of the fact that Rule 412 is, in fact, a
relevancy rule? When I move to the nude dancing evidence ruling, I begin by
asking whether, under the logic seemingly approved by the court, if we
substitute “bank teller” for nude dancer, the probative value would be the
same? If there is laughter in response—and there often is—I remind the
students that Rule 412 was designed to neutralize the effect of knowing that the
plaintiff was engaged in a profession that is code for sexual promiscuity.44 The
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis does not treat the nude dancing as neutral. The
defendant’s relevance logic seems to go something like this: because Ms. Judd
can continue in her profession as a nude dancer, it is more likely that she does
not feel dirty than without the evidence. Perhaps the court has engaged in
more offensive logic: because Ms. Judd engages in nude dancing, she has a
less credible claim to “feeling dirty” than without the evidence. Both kinds of
relevance logic rely on the now impermissible inference that one can use
lifestyle evidence to extrapolate sexual behavior and beliefs. If we truly
neutralize the sexually coded profession of nude dancer by substituting “bank
teller,” the court’s decision makes no sense. Plaintiff’s employment as a bank
teller before and after the event would offer us no insight into whether her
claim that she “felt dirty” was genuine.
To wrap up the discussion, I ask the students to, in effect, take a step back,
and think about what Rule 412 calls on judges to do in civil cases and why that
might be problematic. The Rule appears to assume that, unlike the jury, the
judge can evaluate probative value unencumbered by the very cultural

41. Id. at 1342.
42. See FED. R. EVID. 103.
43. The defense claimed that Rule 412 did not apply. Judd, 105 F.3d at 1340. The trial
court demonstrated explicit skepticism about its applicability and refused to rule. See id. at 1341.
In fact, the Eleventh Circuit never ruled on the issue either. Id. at 1342.
44. The Advisory Committee’s Notes say: “This amendment is designed to exclude evidence
that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may
have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.” FED. R. EVID. 412(a) Advisory Committee’s
Notes.
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preconceptions that gave rise to the need for an exclusionary rule to begin
with. I hope they will come to appreciate the irony.45
The impact of point of view arises even in the simplest of evidence rules.
Rule 804 permits the admission of hearsay evidence in limited situations in
which the declarant is unavailable.46 The Rule specifies the circumstances in
which there is assumed to be unavailability. That definition includes when
[the declarant] is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance . . . by process or other
reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if . . . absence is
due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.47

I examine these requirements using a problem drawn from a Tenth Circuit
opinion, Garcia-Martinez v. City and County of Denver.48
Jose Garcia sued the Los Angeles police department for police brutality after
sustaining significant neck and back injuries during an arrest in east L.A. Mr.
Garcia is an undocumented person from Honduras. During the litigation, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a deportation order. Before that
order was executed, however, the Plaintiff, Mr. Garcia, gave a deposition about
the events that led up to his claim of brutality. After that deposition but before
the case got to trial, Mr. Garcia voluntarily surrendered to the Immigration
officials rather than being subject to surprise arrest on the street or in his home.
Mr. Garcia was then deported to Honduras. The defense is aware of his
deportation. Despite Mr. Garcia’s absence, the case proceeds.
At trial, the plaintiff’s attorney seeks to offer Mr. Garcia’s deposition in lieu of
his testimony, relying upon Rule 804(b)(1). The defense objects.49

I ask my students to identify the potential grounds for objection. Because
it is a deposition done in the same case, they note that the objection must be
based on the failure to prove unavailability. I ask the students what showing
the plaintiff must make. I ask the students whether showing the deportation
order would be sufficient to show unavailability. Most say yes. Some suggest
that his voluntary surrender undermines his claim of unavailability. I ask if
they would think he was unavailable if he had been arrested and then deported?

45. The fact that judges are as human as jurors in their inability to disregard information that
is not relevant to the proceedings is empirically documented in Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris
Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
46. FED. R. EVID. 804.
47. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
48. 392 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2004).
49. Id. at 1189–90.
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I then offer the opinion. The Court did not find Mr. Garcia unavailable.50 It
said:
In applying the rule, we look at two factors to determine “unavailability.”
The first factor is whether the proponent was able to “procure” the witness’s
attendance “by process or other reasonable means.” Garcia-Martinez does not
literally meet this requirement since he voluntarily failed to return to Colorado
for trial. The second factor looks to whether the absence is “due to the
procurement or wrongdoing” of the proponent of the testimony. GarciaMartinez also does not literally meet this requirement, since his absence at trial
was calculated.
Confronting the rule’s plain language, Garcia-Martinez again asks us to
apply a “good faith” exception. His argument is that the absence from trial
must be for the “purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 804(a). Since his absence was due to exigent
circumstances beyond his control, the court should find him “unavailable”
under the rule. We disagree that he is entitled to an exception on this record.51

Mr. Garcia’s lawyer appears to have assumed that the deportation papers
would be sufficient. They were not. I next ask the students to consider the
following hypothetical:
Joe Smith is a plaintiff in a civil action seeking damages. His deposition is
taken. Before the case goes to trial, Mr. Smith, a member of the Army
Reserves, is put on active status and sent to Iraq. He is deployed and is not
present at the time of trial. The plaintiff’s attorney requests that his deposition
be used in lieu of testimony. The attorney offers evidence of Mr. Smith’s
deployment to prove the evidentiary requirement of unavailability.

How should the court rule? Should Mr. Smith have refused to go when called
and risked arrest in order to show unavailability? If Mr. Smith does not
attempt to get leave to go home from Iraq, does that defeat his lawyer’s claim
of unavailability?
When students attempt to draw different conclusions than the court in
Garcia-Martinez, I ask them to explain how these hypothetical facts differ
from the case. This discussion is rich with attempts to make distinctions that,
50. Id. at 1193.
51. Id. In dissent, Judge Lucero criticized the narrow reading of unavailability and said:
I neither agree that he procured his own absence from trial, nor that he made an
insufficient showing of a good-faith effort to be available for live testimony. His absence
was procured by the United States government. In August of 2000, officers of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service deported Garcia to Honduras, and at all times
relevant to this action, he has remained under a standing deportation order. It is true he
left the country on his own after filing the present action, but the law is no less
compulsory to someone who complies with its dictates under fear of reprisal than for
someone who waits for the corrective power of the state to do it for him.
Id. at 1195.
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when pursued, become distinctions without a difference. Most students are
unwilling to require that Mr. Smith not answer to his call to activate in order to
be “available,” and the requirement to show that he sought permission to leave
the field of battle to prove “unavailability” seems a waste of time.52 It is not
lost on the students that this is a circuit court opinion, presumably subject to
significant thought and review. I close this discussion by asking them how this
evidentiary ruling, which ends any chance of resolution of the litigation, helps
move the fact-finder toward truth and fair administration of justice as required
by Rule 102.53
These are a few examples of problems that can be used in an Evidence
course to remind students that even though the goal of the rules of evidence is
to arrive at “the truth,” the truth may be a function of point of view. As critical
race theory and the incidence of “driving while black” has taught me, as a
white woman, my experience of seeing a police car in my tail lights is very
different than a black man’s experience of the same event. Yet it is my
“general” perspective that often is privileged in the rules of evidence. Thus,
rules of evidence implicate deep questions of social justice. As Evidence
teachers, we need to equip our students with the tools to follow the injunction
of Rule 102 “that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.”54 Teaching Evidence as a course provides an important avenue
for teaching about complexity and about how hard it is to get to the truth, how
non-neutral supposed neutral rules actually are, and how attention to process as
much as attention to substance can ensure that we get closer to the truth.55
Coping with the rules of evidence requires both planning and spontaneity. It
requires strategic thinking and effective oral advocacy. It requires the ability
to dissect a case into its component parts, evaluate the evidence, and present
the story so to expose the embedded point of view. Students who are attuned
to this bring a critical analysis to their approach to law that makes them far
more perceptive and, ultimately, better lawyers. More importantly, such
attention creates a higher likelihood of the kind of “truth” that will result in a
just outcome.

52. Students inevitably point out that it is entirely likely that the court would grant any
request to delay the trial until after Mr. Smith’s tour of duty. As with many hypothetical
questions, it is important not to permit the “easy out.” Because we know that Mr. Smith will
eventually be back in the state legitimately, there may be a clear distinction between the two
cases. This does not explain why the Garcia-Martinez court did not grant a continuance in order
to try to procure Mr. Garcia’s presence in his case against the state.
53. FED. R. EVID. 102.
54. Id.
55. See generally Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002).

